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Previous studies on social anxiety have demonstrated negative-expectancy bias in social
contexts. In this study, we used a paradigm that employed self-relevant positive or
negative social feedback, in order to test whether this negative expectancy manifests
in event-related potentials (ERPs) during social evaluation among socially anxious
individuals. Behavioral data revealed that individuals with social anxiety disorder (SAD)
showed more negative expectancy of peer acceptance both in the experiment and in
daily life than did the healthy control participants. Regarding ERP results, we found a
overally larger P2 for positive social feedback and also a group main effect, such that
the P2 was smaller in SAD group. SAD participants demonstrated a larger feedback-
related negativity (FRN) to positive feedback than to negative feedback. In addition, SAD
participants showed a more positive FRN (FRN = negative – positive). Furthermore,
acceptance expectancy in daily life correlated negatively with FRN amplitude, while the
Interaction Anxiousness Scale (IAS) score correlated positively with theFRN amplitude.
Finally, the acceptance expectancy in daily life fully mediated the relationship between
the IAS and FRN. These results indicated that both groups could differentiate between
positive and negative social feedback in the early stage of social feedback processing
(reflected on the P2). However, the SAD group exhibited a larger FRN to positive social
feedback than to negative social feedback, demonstrating their dysfunction in the late
stage of social feedback processing. In our opinion, such dysfunction is due to their
greater negative social feedback expectancy.
Keywords: feedback-related negativity (FRN), P2, outcome evaluation, social anxiety disorder, social rejection
INTRODUCTION
Social anxiety disorder (SAD) is characterized by fear of negative evaluation from others in social
contexts according to the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders IV (American
Psychiatric Association, 2000). Such intense fear of social evaluation is associated with a negative
cognitive bias (i.e., negative-expectancy bias), which in turn impairs social ability in daily life. The
cognitive-behavioral model of social anxiety proposes that socially anxious individuals assume
that other people are inherently critical (Rapee and Heimberg, 1997) and have a negative-
expectancy bias, i.e., severely socially anxious individuals hold a generalized belief that other people
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tend to evaluate them more negatively and underestimate their
social performance (Leary et al., 1988; Alden and Wallace, 1995;
Spence et al., 1999). For instance, socially anxious participants
rated interviewers as having more negative opinions about them
(Pozo et al., 1991). The existence of such a negative-expectancy
bias was also conﬁrmed in a recent study, which indicated that
highly socially anxious individuals showed lower expectancy
of positive social feedback in a two-visit task (Caouette et al.,
2015). In a word, converging evidences have suggested that
socially anxious individuals and patients with SAD demonstrate a
negative bias in their expectancy for, and interpretation of, social
evaluation (Amin et al., 1998; Messenger et al., 2004; Franklin
et al., 2005; Creswell et al., 2014).
According to the cognitive-behavioral models of social
anxiety, the relationship between cognitive processes (negative
beliefs in social contexts) and social behaviors (perpetuated
avoidance and withdrawal) is the core mechanism that comprises
and maintains social anxiety (Heimberg et al., 2010). The
negative-expectancy bias is one of the key cognitive aspects of
SAD and plays a important role in the core mechanism of
social anxiety. First, it leads to withdrawal or avoidance behavior
among socially anxious individuals (Bogels and Mansell, 2004;
Stirling et al., 2006), which results in poor social performance.
Furthermore, negative evaluation of their performance may
further lower their level of self-esteem and reinforce their
negative belief (Leary, 1990; Stopa and Clark, 2000; de Jong, 2002;
Amir et al., 2005; Laposa et al., 2010).
However, to our knowledge, there has been no direct
evidence of the neural correlates of social feedback processing in
SAD, which could demonstrate the relationship between social
evaluation expectancy and outcome evaluation. The primary
aim of the present study, therefore, was to examine the social
evaluation expectancy bias and social outcome processing in
individuals with SAD using a neuroscience approach.
As a brain area closely related to conﬂict monitoring
(Botvinick et al., 2004) and pain (Eisenberger and Lieberman,
2004), the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) has been suggested
to be activated by social feedback (Somerville et al., 2006, 2010;
Gunther Moor et al., 2010). For instance, a study using a
Chat Room task showed that positive feedback evoked stronger
activations in the ACC, as compared with negative feedback
(Guyer et al., 2012). This task has also shown individual
diﬀerences in ACC activity during social feedback processing
(Bolling et al., 2011; Masten et al., 2011). For example, functional
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) results have indicated that
individuals with low self-esteem showed increased ACC activity
in response to social rejection than those with high self-esteem
(Onoda et al., 2010). One key event-related potential (ERP)
component identiﬁed to be sensitive to outcome feedback is
the feedback-related negativity (FRN), which is considered to be
associated with the reward prediction-error mechanism located
in the ACC (Holroyd and Coles, 2002; Yeung and Sanfey,
2004; Holroyd et al., 2006). This component is considered as
an important biomarker in a large body of work on outcome
evaluation (Gehring and Willoughby, 2002; Holroyd et al., 2004;
Nieuwenhuis et al., 2004; Yeung et al., 2005; Wu and Zhou, 2009;
Pedroni et al., 2011; Osinsky et al., 2014). Numerous studies
have shown that the FRN is sensitive to outcome expectation
(e.g., Hajcak et al., 2007), supporting the concept that the ACC
is involved in predicting and signaling unexpected outcomes,
regardless of their valence (Ferdinand et al., 2012). A recent study
combining expectation and social feedback showed that the FRN
is sensitive to both social prediction error and social rejection
(Sun and Yu, 2014). Speciﬁcally, a more negative FRN waveform
was observed when people were socially rejected and their explicit
expectancy was violated. We thus predict that the relatively
less optimistic expectancy being prevalent in individuals with
SAD may lead to a larger FRN in response to positive social
feedback.
Indeed, several previous ERP studies on social feedback
processing have reported the eﬀect of social anxiety on ERPs
(Van der Molen et al., 2013; Kujawa et al., 2014). For example,
an ERP study in young individuals using an “Island Getaway
task” found a more negative FRN in response to negative than
to positive feedback (Kujawa et al., 2014). More interestingly,
their results also showed the inﬂuence of social anxiety on the
FRN, such that a higher level of social anxiety was related to
greater rejection − acceptance diﬀerentiation (FRN). Besides
the FRN, the signiﬁcances of the P2 and P3 component for
feedback processing have also been reported (Hajcak et al., 2005;
Leng and Zhou, 2010; Lange et al., 2012; Schuermann et al.,
2012; Flores et al., 2015). Although it remains controversial
as to whether P3 can diﬀerentiate good from bad outcome,
several studies have shown such a diﬀerentiation eﬀect (Hajcak
et al., 2005, 2007; Wu and Zhou, 2009). Frontal P2 is associated
with the early stage of attention processing (Van der Molen
et al., 2013). A number of studies have indicated that the
P2 is also modulated by motivational relevance and aﬀective
signiﬁcance (Cuthbert et al., 2000; Carretie et al., 2001, 2004).
Moreover, a recent study reported that a strongly psychopathic
group showed increased P2 and decreased P3 following reward
delivering (Salim et al., 2015). In the current study, we expected
to observe group diﬀerences in P2 amplitude, since individuals
with higher rejection sensitivity have been reported to show
a larger P2 in a modiﬁed face dot-probe task (Ehrlich et al.,
2015).
To elicit the FRN in social feedback, we used the “Island
Getaway task,” which is similar to the paradigm used by Kujawa
et al. (2014). The primary goal of the current study was
to investigate whether SAD individuals would exhibit more
pessimistic expectancy in a social evaluation situation. The
second aim was to examine whether the expectancy diﬀerence
between a SAD and non-SAD group would manifest in the
FRN amplitude during social feedback processing, particularly
positive feedback. We expected that the negative expectancy in
SAD would lead to a larger FRN to positive social feedback.
Following the FRN ﬁndings by Kujawa et al. (2014), we also
expected to observe between-group diﬀerences and the inﬂuence
of expectancy on FRN. Speciﬁcally, we expected a larger
FRN for SAD group for their lower acceptance expectancy.
Additionally, given that the high social rejection sensitivity was
associated with larger P2 to faces (Ehrlich et al., 2015), we
expected a smaller P2 for SAD group after the feedback onset due
to their earlier elevated attention on faces. Considering that P3 is
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a classic outcome evaluation component, we also measured and
analyzed this component.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
The study was carried out in accordance with the Declaration of
Helsinki and the experimental protocols were approved by the
institutional review board (IRB) of Harbin Medical University.
All participants provided written informed consent for the
experiment.
The participants were recruited in two stages: the screen and
the diagnostic interview. Two psychologists collected data in the
screening stage. Additionally, two psychiatrists were in charge of
the diagnostic interview in the follow-up stage of this study.
Screening Stage
We selected 1836 students by stratiﬁed randomized sampling;
this group covered a wide range of socio-demographic status
of all students attending Harbin Medical University (Da Qing
Campus). These sampled students completed the Interaction
Anxiousness Scale (IAS) questionnaire (Leary and Kowalski,
1993); based on a rule of thumb, after ranking the scores of the
IAS, the top 27% and bottom 27% of students were classiﬁed as
the high-score group and the low-score group respectively, and
the remaining students were classiﬁed as the intermediate-score
group (Wiersma and Jurs, 1985).
Follow-up Stage
All students in the high-score group were checked by the
validated Chinese translation of the Structured Clinical Interview
for DSM-IV (SCID-IV; Ruying et al., 1997), as the gold
standard for assessing SAD; the results revealed that 102 students
met the criteria for SAD. In the current study, we recruited
21 of these SAD students who agreed to participate in the
electroencephalography (EEG) experiment, together with 21
matched non-socially anxious students [healthy controls (HCs)].
Due to EEG artifacts that aﬀected data quality, the ﬁnal sample
consisted of 40 participants (20 SAD and 20 HC).
Procedure
Three to ﬁve days before the formal experiment, participants
were asked to upload their proﬁles with their photos, study
majors, personal interests, and so on. Participants were told
that they would be evaluated by another 120 peer participants
(half of whom were females) based on the impression created
by their proﬁles. To ensure the plausibility of this cover story,
all participants were asked to evaluate the proﬁles of 10 fake
participants and to vote on whether this person could remain in
the group. This approach was consistent with the “IslandGetaway
task” in which individuals need to vote whether the presented
people may remain on the island, given the limited resources
(Kujawa et al., 2014). Thereafter, the formal procedure presented
60 faces of pseudo-participants with positive social feedback (i.e.,
social acceptance), and another 60 faces with negative social
feedback (i.e., social rejection). All 120 faces were presented twice,
resulting in 240 trials in total. The procedure is illustrated in
Figure 1.
During the feedback-processing task, the face of the
pseudo-participant, indicating the one who would evaluate the
participant in this trial, was presented for 2000−2500 ms.
Thereafter, social feedback was presented for 1000−1500 ms. An
inter-trial interval was randomized from 1000 to 1500 ms, which
appeared at the end of each trial (see Figure 1). The probability
of the appearance of positive/negative social feedback was set as
equal for each trial.
In the formal procedure, all instructions were presented
with Microsoft PowerPoint (2013) software (Microsoft, Inc.,
Redmond, WA, USA). All aforementioned procedures were
conducted using E-Prime software (Version 2.0, Psychology
Software Tools, Inc., Pittsburgh, PA, USA).
Expectation Rating
After the EEG procedure, participants were instructed to assess
to what extent they expected their peers to accept them in real life
on a scale from 0 to 100, with 0 = “Not at all” and 100 = “Very
much.” Given that the number of evaluation faces used in the
experiment was large (n = 120 in total), participants were also
asked to rate how many peers they expected would accept them
prior to the experiment (60 was the midpoint in this case); we also
asked participants to rate their expectation after the experiment.
Thus, the former rating measured real-life expectancy, while the
latter measured the expectancy in the experiment.
Electroencephalographic (EEG)
Recording and Preprocessing
During the EEG recording, participants sat comfortably in
an electrically shielded room approximately 80 cm from a
computer screen. The EEG data was recorded using a 64-channel
NeuroScan system (Neuroscan, Inc, Herndon, VA, USA). Raw
EEG data were sampled at 1000 Hz/channel, referenced to
the nose on-line, with impedances lower than 5 k. Vertical
electrooculograms (VEOGs) were recorded supra- and infra-
orbitally for the left eye. Horizontal EOGs (HEOG) were
recorded by electrodes at the left and right orbital rims. The
online continuous data were digitized with a band-pass of
0.05−100 Hz.
Electroencephalography were re-referenced to the average of
the left and right mastoids and ﬁltered with a low pass of
20 Hz (24 dB/oct) oﬀ-line (Ferdinand et al., 2012). Epochs were
feedback-locked, beginning 100 ms before feedback onset to
500 ms afterward. Ocular artifacts were removed from the EEGs
using a regression procedure implemented in the Neuroscan
software (Scan 4.5, NeuroScan, Inc., Herndon, VA, USA). Trials
exceeding the threshold of ±80 μV were excluded from further
analysis. Trials of two conditions (acceptance and rejection) were
averaged, and a −100 to 0 ms baseline was used to perform a
baseline correction.
ERP Analysis
We were interested in the between-group diﬀerence on ERPs
in both the positive and the negative feedback conditions.
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FIGURE 1 | A sample trial in the social feedback stage. The face of the evaluator was first presented for 2000−2500 ms; then, feedback of acceptance (√) or
rejection (×) was presented below the face for 1000−1500 ms.
Therefore, we directly measured the FRN in grand-averaged
waveforms rather than the diﬀerence waves between positive
and negative trials. The grand-averaged ERPs at FCz and
Pz and the corresponding topography map are presented in
Figure 2. The P2 component was detected as a peak amplitude
at C1, Cz, and C2 at 220−280 ms, since P2 then reached
its maximum over these electrodes (see Figure 2). The P3
component was detected at three parietal electrodes (CP1,
CPz, and CP2). The FRN was detected at three fronto-central
electrodes (FC1, FCz, and FC2), which are usually used for
FRN detection (Zottoli and Grose-Fifer, 2012; Luo et al.,
2014). Visual observation of the topography map supported the
above selections (see Figure 2). The original FRN amplitude
was measured for each participant as the peak amplitude
within the 280–340 ms window. However, considering that
the P2 was also sensitive to negative vs. positive diﬀerence
and group diﬀerence in our study, we used a peak-to-peak
measurement here to eliminate the potential inﬂuence of P2
on the FRN (Ferdinand et al., 2012). Therefore, the reported
FRN results are based on the diﬀerence of the FRN and P2
amplitudes. The P3 was identiﬁed as the average amplitude
within the 340−450 ms window. To directly compare with
the ﬁnding of Kujawa et al. (2014), we also analyzed the
negative minus the positive amplitude diﬀerence (FRN), in
which more negative values reﬂect heightened reactivity to
negative vs. positive feedback. The averaged P2, P3, and FRN
amplitudes were entered into a 2 (feedback valence: positive
vs. negative) × 2 (group: SAD vs. HC) analysis of variance
(ANOVA). In addition, the FRN was incorporated into a
two-sample t-test with group as the between-subject variable.
The reported degrees of freedom of the F-ratio were corrected
by using the Greenhouse–Geisser method when the sphericity
assumption was violated.
RESULTS
Patient Demographics
The basic information of the participants is provided in Table 1.
An independent-samples t-test revealed that the two groups
diﬀered signiﬁcantly in anxiety scores, but not in age or gender
ratio. All participants had normal vision (with correction), and
were right-handed.
Feedback Expectancy Results
The expectancy probabilities of peer acceptance in both real life
and in the experiment were analyzed. The two sample t-test
showed that the SAD participants (M = 58.5%, SD = 13.96)
showed signiﬁcantly lower peer-acceptance expectancy in real
life than did the HCs (M = 78.95%, SD = 15.09; t38 = 4.614,
p< 0.001). Similarly, SAD participants (M = 43.5%, SD = 13.89)
also had signiﬁcantly more negative-acceptance expectancy in the
experiment than did HC participants (M = 58.62%, SD = 11.13;
t38 = 3.847, p < 0.001).
The two types of expectancy probability were positively
correlated (r = 0.492, p < 0.001). Moreover, the IAS score was
negatively correlated with both social acceptance expectancy in
real life (r = −0.663, p < 0.001) and acceptance expectancy in
the experiment (r = −0.421, p < 0.01).
ERP Results
Figure 2 shows the ERPs elicited by the two types of feedback at
the midline electrodes (FCz, Cz, CPz, and Pz).
The P2 Component
Analysis of variance on P2 amplitudes revealed a signiﬁcant
main eﬀect of feedback valence (F1,38 = 16.09, p < 0.001,
η2p = 0.297), such that positive social feedback (M = 4.60 μV,
SE = 0.43) evoked a larger P2 than did negative social feedback
(M = 3.53 μV, SE = 0.41). Furthermore, the P2 amplitude
also indicated a signiﬁcant main eﬀect of group (F1,38 = 8.63,
p < 0.01, η2p = 0.185), such that the SAD group (M = 2.91 μV,
SE = 0.56) had a smaller P2 than did the HC group regardless of
feedback valence (M = 5.23 μV, SE = 0.56).
The FRN
For the peak-peak FRN amplitudes, ANOVA indicated a
signiﬁcant main eﬀect of feedback valence (F1,38 = 7.84, p< 0.01,
η2p = 0.171), showing that the FRN of positive social feedback
(M = −3.14μV, SE = 0.33) was larger than that of negative social
feedback (M = −2.41 μV, SE = 0.31). Furthermore, the feedback
valence × group interaction eﬀect (F1,38 = 5.79, p < 0.05,
η2p = 0.132) indicated that only SAD participants showed such
a positive vs. negative FRN eﬀect (positive: M = −3.40 μV,
SE = 0.47, negative: M = −2.04 μV, SE = 0.43), whereas HC
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FIGURE 2 | Grand averaged event-related potentials (ERPs) and topographic maps of the two feedback types for the social anxiety disorder (SAD)
and healthy control (HC) groups over midline electrodes (FCz, Cz, CPz, and Pz).
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TABLE 1 | Characteristics and self-reported measures of participant
groups.
SAD group
(n = 20)
Healthy controls
(n = 20)
t-test
(df = 38)
Age in years (SD) 20 (1.11) 20.42 (0.74) 1.476
Gender (% females) 63.6% 61.9% χ2 test,
p = 0.74
IAS (SD) 51.05 (11.36) 30.29 (5.60) −7.337∗∗∗
STAI
Trait anxiety (SD) 49.64 (13.75) 33.67 (7.60) −4.317∗∗∗
State anxiety (SD) 47.68 (14.44) 30.38 (7.36) −4.539∗∗∗
SES (SD) 24.41 (6.31) 32.71 (2.68) 5.229∗∗∗
SAD, social anxiety disorder; IAS, Interaction Anxiousness Scale; SES, self-
esteem scale; STAI, Chinese version of Spielberger’s trait anxiety inventory (STAI);
∗∗∗p < 0.001.
participants did not (positive:M= −2.90μV, SE= 0.45, negative:
M = −2.77 μV, SE = 0.46, p = 0.72).
Furthermore, the FRN (rejection – acceptance) analysis
showed that SAD participants had a more positive FRN
(M= 1.36μV, SD= 1.60) than didHCs (M = 0.10μV, SD= 1.69;
t38 = −2.41, p < 0.05).
The P3 Component
Analysis of variance on P3 failed to ﬁnd any social feedback eﬀect
or group-related eﬀect (Fs < 1.30, ps > 0.27).
Correlations between Behavioral and
ERP Results
A bivariate correlation analysis showed that the peer-acceptance
expectancy in real life correlated negatively with the FRN
(r = −0.469, p < 0.01). Interestingly, the IAS score correlated
positively with the FRN (r = 0.342, p < 0.05). No other
signiﬁcant correlation was detected.
Mediation Analysis Results
We conducted a mediation analysis to assess whether the
acceptance expectancy in real life lays in the causal path between
the IAS score and the FRN amplitude, using a bootstrapping
number of 5000 (Preacher and Hayes, 2008). In the analysis
model, FRN was set as the outcome variable, acceptation
expectancy in real life served as the mediator, and the IAS score
was entered as the predictor (see Figure 3), and the analysis was
performed as described by (Preacher and Hayes, 2004). First,
we found that the direct eﬀect in the model with acceptance
expectancy was not signiﬁcant (B = 0.56, SE = 0.19, p > 0.77).
Second, a signiﬁcant indirect eﬀect of social anxiety through
acceptance expectancy was conﬁrmed (B = 0.287, SE = 1.34,
p = 0.025) at a 95% bias-corrected conﬁdence interval (95%, CI:
0.0105−0.5624), establishing that acceptance expectancy was in
the causal path between social anxiety and FRN.
DISCUSSION
The primary aim of the present study was to investigate whether
people with SAD exhibit less positive expectancy in social
situations than healthy people, and to what extent this kind of
expectancy bias manifests in the ERPs. By using a social feedback
task, we found that SAD participants had less positive social
acceptance expectancy in both real life and experimental social
situations than did HCs. The ERP ﬁndings of FRN showed
a more negative FRN in response to positive feedback than
to negative feedback in SAD individuals. We interpret this
ﬁnding as indicating that lower expectation is associated with
a larger FRN. Thus, this result reﬂects the cognitive negative
bias in SAD. Moreover, the correlation between acceptance
expectancy, IAS and FRN amplitude further conﬁrms that
highly socially anxious participants showed a larger positive vs.
negative diﬀerentiation, since this was mediated by acceptance
expectancy.
Larger FRN for Positive Social Feedback
vs. Negative Feedback in SAD
Previous studies on anxious participants have reported individual
diﬀerences in the FRN, such that larger FRN amplitudes are
associated with lower levels of anxiety (Gu et al., 2010a,b;
Simons, 2010; Takács et al., 2015). In the current study, the
SAD group showed more negative FRN values for positive than
for negative social feedback. We suggest that this result may
indicate the negative expectancy in SAD participants. Indeed,
behavioral measures showed that their expectancy rate of being
accepted was 43.5% in the experiment situation, which was
signiﬁcantly lower than the random level (50%, p < 0.05).
Such an inference eﬀect was consistent with the prediction
of the response-outcome theory (Alexander and Brown, 2010,
2011) that FRN is related to subjective expectancy, regardless of
feedback valence.
An alternative interpretation of the larger FRN to positive
feedback in SAD individuals is the blunting of the FRN after
negative feedback in SAD (see Figure 2). That is, considering
that the FRN is also related to performance monitoring (see
review Ullsperger et al., 2014), a dysfunction in the social
performance monitoring processes of anxious participants may
result in weaker sensitivity to negative feedback. In parallel
with this hypothesis, previous studies in depression (Foti and
Hajcak, 2009) have also shown a blunted FRN on non-reward
feedback. A recent study on problematic internet use (PIU;
Yau et al., 2015) also indicated overall decreased sensitivity
to feedback in individuals with PIU, which manifested as a
reduced FRN. For the purpose of social adaptation, negative
feedback is of great signiﬁcance for adjusting social behavior
to be more favorable (Ruﬀ and Fehr, 2014). Individuals with
SAD may have impaired negative social feedback processing,
which is reﬂected by blunted neural responses to negative
feedback.
The absence of diﬀerences in FRN between negative and
positive feedback in HCs is consistent with some previous studies
that did not report an FRN diﬀerentiation eﬀect (Bolling et al.,
2011; Leitner et al., 2014; Dekkers et al., 2015). For example, with
a similar social feedback paradigm, Leitner et al. (2014) did not
ﬁnd any feedback eﬀect on the FRN. However, the absent positive
vs. negative feedback eﬀect seems inconsistent with previous
studies which showed that the FRN is sensitive to the valence of
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FIGURE 3 | Mediation model with standardized regression coefficients for the relationship between social anxiety and FRN. Mediation model with
standardized regression coefficients showing the relationship between social anxiety and FRN as mediated by acceptance expectancy. The standardized
regression coefficient between the Interaction Anxiousness Scale (IAS) score and FRN, controlling for acceptance expectancy, was 0.05. Social anxiety (IAS score)
predicted the acceptance expectancy (B = −0.663), which in turn predicted FRN (B = −0.469). The direct effect of IAS on FRN (when expectancy bias was
included in the model) was not significant, p = 0.77, while the indirect effect was significant, indicating that acceptance expectancy fully mediated the relationship
between IAS and FRN. X: predictor, Y: outcome variable, M: mediate variable, ∗p < 0.05; ∗∗p < 0.01; ∗∗∗p < 0.001.
social feedback, and ismore negative in response to rejection than
to being accepted (Kujawa et al., 2014; Sun and Yu, 2014). We
posit that the paradigm used, or the ERP measurement itself, may
contribute to such inconsistent ﬁndings. Regarding the paradigm,
in Sun and Yu’s (2014) study, Somerville’s task was used, which
presented the expectation and feedback simultaneously, was used,
while only the feedback from the peer was presented in our
task. Regarding the measurement, the FRN eﬀect is strongly
dependent on how the FRN is quantiﬁed. In Kujawa et al.’s
(2014) work, the FRN was scored as the original FRN mean
amplitude, but not as the peak-to-peak amplitude. In contrast,
we reported peak-to-peak amplitude results due to the potential
P2 inﬂuence. When using the same measurement in the original
research of Kujawa et al. (2014), the main eﬀect of feedback,
i.e., that negative feedback evoked more negative FRN, was also
observed.1 The current study was unable to determine whether
either or both of the above factors contribute to the absence of
positive vs. negative eﬀect. Further research is required to clarify
this issue.
Relationship between Expectation,
Social Anxiety, and FRN
FRN is an index of the level of diﬀerentiation between
negative and positive feedback, which was found to be
sensitive to individual diﬀerences in social anxiety in a
previous study (Kujawa et al., 2014). In the current study,
we further established the link between expectancy, social
anxiety and FRN. First, SAD participants showed a larger
FRN (negative – positive) than did HCs. Moreover, this
1When we analyzed the original FRN mean amplitude, the ANOVA indicated a
signiﬁcant main eﬀect of feedback valence (F1,38 = 5.737, p < 0.05, η2p = 0.131),
indicating more negative FRN in response to negative feedback.
index was correlated with acceptance expectancy in real life
as well as with the IAS score. More speciﬁcally, individuals
with high acceptance expectancy in real life exhibited a smaller
FRN, and individuals with high social anxiety exhibited a
larger FRN in response to social feedback. Finally, mediation
analysis conﬁrmed that the acceptance expectancy in real
life fully mediated the correlation between social anxiety and
FRN.
In line with the cognitive-behavior model of social anxiety
(Rapee and Heimberg, 1997), it is conceivable that social
expectancy mediated the FRN eﬀect in social feedback
processing. That is, an increase in social interaction anxiety
predicted a decline in social acceptance expectancy in real
life, which in turn predicted the FRN diﬀerence between the
response to social positive vs. negative feedback. For SAD
individuals, negative beliefs about social situations lead to
their negative expectancy of future social evaluation (Caouette
et al., 2015). Such negative expectancy also inﬂuences social
evaluation processing, which is reﬂected by a more negative
FRN to positive social feedback and a more negative FRN
(negative – positive). The dysfunction in social evaluation
diﬀerentiation (indicated by a larger FRN) may further
reinforce SAD individuals’ cognitive symptoms or negative
beliefs during social life. In line with the existing studies that
proposed the FRN as a biomarker in psychopathology (Olvet
and Hajcak, 2008; Proudﬁt, 2015), we suggest that the FRN in
response to social feedback may serve as a potential biomarker of
SAD.
The Social Feedback Valence Effect and
Group Effect on P2
Although there have been many ERP studies on social rejection,
few studies have reported the P2 eﬀect (Sreekrishnan et al., 2014).
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Our results showed a smaller P2 for social rejection, which is
consistent with a previous study on autism spectrum disorder
subjects that also showed a smaller P2 for rejection, regardless of
the group diﬀerence (McPartland et al., 2011).
In the current study, there was a between-group diﬀerence
in P2: the HC group showed a larger P2 to social feedback
than did the SAD group. A smaller P2 in anxious participants
than in non-anxious participants has also been observed in a
study using fear stimuli (Frenkel and Bar-Haim, 2011), in which
non-anxious participants showed overall larger ERPs (P1, P2,
early posterior negativity). The anxiety-related attenuation of
early P2 was also found in social distance processing (Perry
et al., 2013). Given these ﬁndings, we consider that the reduced
P2 associated with social rejection in the SAD group reﬂects
reduced engagement of attentional resources during the early
stage of social feedback processing (McPartland et al., 2011). Such
a smaller P2 for SAD individuals may reﬂect a critical social
avoidance; i.e., smaller P2 amplitudes in SAD indicates an early
avoidance response after the face of the evaluator was presented,
since socially anxious individuals tend to avoid social contact
(Amir et al., 1998; Heuer et al., 2007; Lange et al., 2008; Heitmann
et al., 2014).
CONCLUSION
To sum up, both groups showed an positive vs. negative
diﬀerentiation eﬀect on the P2, which also showed a between-
group diﬀerence. This result might reﬂect a shared early social
evaluation sensitivity mechanism for both socially anxious and
non-anxious individuals, although it might also sensitive to the
level of social anxiety. Furthermore, SAD participants exhibited
a larger FRN to positive social feedback and a blunted FRN
to negative social feedback, demonstrating their dysfunction
in feedback processing. Combining the ERP ﬁndings, and the
correlation and the mediation eﬀect for FRN, our results
indicated that FRN is a potential biomarker for SAD.
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